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INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to resist books with the title of "confession." Will its author confess to the
world of those actions and thoughts that shame us most and so ameliorate our suffering?
Following Augustine's great book, similar accounts by Rousseau (1781-1788), Goethe
(1811-33), Gide (1889-1949, [1967]), and others have earned a place in literature. The number
of non-confessional autobiographies is immense: Kaplan (1961) lists more than 6,000 titles
by Americans alone. Regardless of their literary merits, autobiographies have an additional
narcissistic value. Our own needs to feel worthwhile and unique are satisfied, in a
roundabout way, when we compare ourselves and these sublime masters. Yet confession
maintains their luster since they have felt their inner life was worth reporting to the masses,
while few of us could muster that belief. 'Ib this point, Freud's masterpiece, The
Interpretation ofDreams (1900) achieves authority precisely because it contains so many
"confessions." It reveals Freud's jealous, petty, sexualized, and hostile wishes, his grandiose
ambitions, and his severe neuroticisms. In other words, it reveals a pe~on much like
ourselves, the difference being that Freud and Augustine created intellectual modes that
permit confession but prevent narcissistic abasement.
Henri Ellenberger (1970) persuades me that much of Freud's influence stems from
his enormous literary talents. His first dream, "Irma's Injection;' requires seventeen pages
of dense interpretation (and has been re-interpreted numerous times since). I t is his dream;
it deals with his most private feelings, his hopes, his wishes, and his characteristic defenses,
including an ignoble attempt to cover up his friend's medical errors. Freud's text operates
much like Confessions: an inherently personal story, one's dreams, or'one's conversion, are
made public and, via literary genius, transformed into authoritative wisdom.
Reading Confessions, even some fifteen centuries after its composition and in
translation, is no mere intellectual moment. I feel it is closer to being confronted by an
impassioned speaker who is not above grabbing one by the lapels in order to force his
message home. This is not always a comfortable experience. However, it does suggest that
Augustine wrote Confessions out of many complex motives. Some of these he states overtly:
to indicate the power of God's intervention, to demonstrate human folly, and to articu~ate
a coherent theology that would counteract the pull of Manichaeism. Others are less manifest
and must be inferred. ThSelle (1970) and other scholars describe some of the difficulties
in assessing clearly all of Augustine's intentions. He notes that Confessions argues
consistently that God alone provides Augustine a sense of the coherence of "his life in
the past, present, and future" (191).
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That makes sense to me, and I believe it accounts for my experience of being pulled
into the text, as a member of Augustine's audience. Augustine's fundamental need to
establish a sense of coherence underlies his use of the read~r. 1b clarify what this means
in contemporary psychoanalytic parlance, I explicate some key concepts in current work
on narcissism, particularly the concept of selfobject (in earlier texts written self-object).
My general thesis is that Confessions is written for an audience which Augustine
uses as selfobjects. That is, we, his imagined audience, are a crucial, underlying element
in his work and our (imagined) responses help him reconstitute himself, to feel coherent
in time and space. This "narcissistic" reading of the text, following Kohut and Winnicott,
suggests that the earlier oedipal interpretations of Confessions overemphasized issues
of sexual conflict and therefore the basic anxiety which Confessions was meant to solve.
I do not fonnulate a diagnosis of Augustine's personality. Since the Confessions covers
most of Augustine's life, it would be difficult to know exactly which portion one felt
represented something like his essential character. I would rather emphasize the profound
devaluation of narcissistic needs which animates the whole of Augustine's account. It
parallels Freud's unanalytic denunciation of narcissism. What is denied and suppressed
must, Freud taught us, reappear in a disguised form as symptoms and alienation.
Confessions was Augustine's solution to his culture's denunciation of narcissistic needs.
Universal needs to feel esteemed and loved by a wholly good object re-emerged in his
theology and in his grand, public confessions. The grandeur and splendor of Augustine's
self-denunciations betray precisely a split self, one part identifying with the Lord who
judges everyone with infinite demanq.s, the other part contrite petitioner. His would be
a confession to God and to humans' at the same time. It would gain him God's forgiveness
and so union with Him, and an audience of readers who would mirror back to him their
esteem.
To clarify these points I first distinguish oedipal anxieties from pre-oedipal anxieties.
I then define the concept of selfobject relationship, and try to show that Confessions
contains Augustine's covert plea for selfobject relationships with both God and his readers.
Finally, I suggest that the hypersexualization which occurs throughout Augustine's
account are unconscious attempts to undo fragmentation experiences. They occur when
he attempts to repair rents in his self-esteem, concentrating himself within hypersexualized
experiences whose intensity guaranteed their importance. Both Augustine and Freud view
such eruptions of sexuality as breakthroughs of repressed, primal instincts. Augustine
calls them inherently sinful. Freud eschews such moralism, but retains the metaphysical
assumption that they represent the outbreak of something immensely powerful and beyond
the ego's control. Kohut's re-evaluation of narcissistic needs and their fulfillment in
selfobject relationships offers an account of such sexualization that is less moralistic than
Augustine's own. (All references to Confessions are from Pine-Coffin's 1961 translation.)
OEDIPAL ANXIETIES AND SELF ANXIETIES
Oedipal theory describes triadic relationships between distinct actors: mother, father,
and child It illuminates the child's stnlgg1es to feel manly or womanly compared to others,
like one's parents, who are more powerful, more "manly" or "womanly" than the child.
The great unconscious symbols of such struggles therefore revolve around genitals (penis
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envy, castration anxiety, etc.) and their fate as the dominant signs of difference and power.
Who is big and who is little? Who has authority over whom? Oedipal conflicts occur
_ between whole persons who feel vulnerable to damage (to being wounded or hurt or
diminished) by other, whole persons who will respond to one's demand for authority with
vengeance. The distinguished authors of the first essays in JSSR took this route when
they analyzed Confessions as dealing with Augustine's conflicts over sexuality and
aggression. How did his idealized and absolutist mother affect his sexual life? How should
we understand the disdain Augustine shows for his biologic81 father, and how does that
fit into his adoration of the Divine Father? I think these are excellent questions. Aside
from Bakan's hostile comments, the previous JSSR pieces, especially that of Dittes (1965),
articulate well this level of Augustine's life.
To these oedipal level readings we can add a pre-oedipal analysis. Toward the end
of his life Freud realized the next great task of his science was to investigate pre-oedipal
history, that is, the child's experiences and traumas prior to the formation of a whole
and complete self. With the broadening scope of analysis beyond neurotic patients, to
the treatment of children, psychotoc persons, and other patient populations, analytic theory
has expanded to encompass these dynamics as well. At that level of work, one finds that
the fundamental anxieties are not castration (or its many variants). Rather, they center
around the infant's needs to receive mothering from a person whose ministrations and
empathy resonate with the infant.
Among those primary needs is the infant's requirement to be held internally and
externally. Using adult metaphors, we may say that the empathic parent contains the
infant's experience of self. The empathic parent does those things, like regulate self-esteem.
which will come gradually under the control of the child's internal world, his or her ego.
The famous "gleam in the mother's eye" is a nice, if homely, example of preciseJy such
holding: she reflects back to her child the child's own need to feel special. Children whose
parents realize that this is the "bestest baby in the world" receive such holding and are
better for it. Those who do not, whose parents have a "realistic" assessment of their child,
cannot reflect back and so validate the child's fundamental need to feel worthy of existence.
Hence such children live in a constant state of narcissistic tension.
Oedipal anxieties are experienced as external attacks upon bodily integrity. Hence
oedipal anxieties utilize metaphors of external harm to a treasured body-part, like the
eyes or the genitals. The dominant imagery of oedipal conflicts, for example in fairy tales
and dreams, centers around the fate of a highly cathected aspect of the body: losing or
gaining a penis. Freud elucidated basic theorems of castration anxiety and penis envy
in his neurotic patients whose conflicts he analyzed at this level of development.
Pre-oedipal anxieties emerge as internal attacks upon the self, either from a persecutor,
like the Wicked Witch, or through unbearable feelings of worthlessness. Fantasies that
one's mind is dissolving, that one's body is made of soap or some other substance that
might disappear, or that one is turning into a machine (Tausk, 1919) dominate pre-oedipal
pathology. A colleague described a midclle-aged patient who felt that his feet, legs, and
torso were changing sequentially from flesh into metal. When this transfonnation reached
the patient's head the psychosis was complete.
Pre-oedipal anxieties are often variations of "Humpty Dumpty." As we know, Humpty
took a great fall and no one could put him together again. Kohut terms such fears
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fragmentation anxiety. It appears directly in the psychotic's fear of going to pieces and
in severely traumatized children. Since everyone was first an infant, then a child, and
so on, everyone will have faced and mastered to some degree or another these fundamental
anxieties. Like castration anxiety, fragmentation anxiety defines one dimension of the
human condition. Hence, like castration anxiety, great cultural institutions, in~uding
religion, have addressed fragmentation anxiety and in many ways contained it.
Weste~ religionists contain it by articulating a portrait of a deity who knows one's
deepest thoughts, is part of our fabric (are we not made in God's image?), and will not
permit us to fall out of the world into nothingness. Unlike the poor astronaut in the film
2001: A Space Odyssey, we cannot be separated from God's love.
Because fragmentation anxiety is ubiquitous and intolerable, humans avoid it at all
costs. Good-enough mothering accomplishes that task for the infant, and good-enough
parenting for the child. Infant and child turn towards loving adults who will provide those
ego functions of synthesis and coherence that are not yet within the infant's purview.
In theological terms, good-enough parents instill hope. In psychoanalytic terms, they act
as selfobjects, as persons who perform internal functions for an ego still forming.
But what about adults? Should we not outgrow such needs and such relationships?
Is not maturation precisely as Freud said it was: to forsake neurotic fantasy solution
for actual, inexact and imperfect real solutions? Again, in contrast to Freud's basic stance.
Kohut argues that no person is immune to the need for others to fulfill these "selfobject"
functions throughout' the lifespan. Happy adults will be neither as needy nor as vulnerable
as infants, but they will require selfobjects just as they require food and water.
Kohut and Freud do not share a common valuation of such needs. This hesp'eaks a
profound difference in scientific ·outlook. Freud views castration anxiety as the ego's weak
response to powerful drives the intensity of which threatens the ego. With ego development
comes an increased capacity to battle against those drives and their associated wishes.
Hence in a real sense neurotics of all ages misperceive their actual situation: they are
childish and afraid of childish forces that now cannot overwhelm them as they once did.
In contrast, Kohut asserts that persons always need selfobjects. Hence, fragmentation
anxiety in very sick patients is not a misperception or a carryover from an infantile past
that will dissolve .upon analysis. On the contrary, healthy adults will recognize that they
too need others, both as whole objects and as selfobjects, that is, as persons who can
help "hold" the self together. In drive theory terms, selfobjects are persons who act on
the side of the "ego instincts" that aim at survival. In more phenomenological terms they
share, momentarilyt our deepest narcissistic feelings that our unique self is worthy of
living, of being whole and powerful. From the outside such needs may appear as grandiose
and irrational. From the inside (Kohut, 1959) they feel equivalent to our desire to breathe.
In a telling metaphor, Kohut refers to the "psychological oxygen" which selfobjects give
us (1977, 1984). To deny the validity of such needs, on the grounds of "objectivity:' for
example, is equivalent to demanding that a person drowning in high seas calm down and
learn to breathe water.
We would expect such demands to elicit a great deal of rage. They do. Failures to
salute a colleague, or cite their work, gains one lifelong enemies. Kohut (1972) elaborates
the varieties of narcissistic rage along a continuum that extends from momentary anger
at being snubbed to the extended and deep anger that dominates many borderline patients
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who feel misheard and misperceived. (A typical history of such patients shows a depressed
mother whom the child struggled to revive in order that she might then reflect back to
the child the child's sense of worth.)
Like Freud, Kohut's discoveries occurred in the field of analytic treatment of psychic
suffering ("mental illness"). Like Freud, Kohut realized quickly that his narrow discoveries
were relevant to larger, non-pathological realms, including religion. However, unlike Freud,
Kohut does not view his discoveries as metaphysical competitors with traditional
·ontologies. Freud knew there was' no God, and he drafted his clinical theories into
philosophic refutations of all those who believed otherwise. Kohut does not leap from
clinical theory to metaphysics this way.
This has an important consequence for humanists familiar with reductive readings
of great texts done under the guise of "applied analysis." While one may count many
brilliant examples of such applications, beginning with Freud's comments on Oedipus
Tyrannus, many .more are disappointing. Why would it be otherwise? Since the genius
of psychoanalysis is an observational, empathic science of actual behavior, utilizing its
terms, abstracted from their home in clinical practice, forfeits that genius. More
importantly, applications of the classical theory tend to be written from on high, without
interacting with the text. Basic clinical values, like neutrality and abstinence, seem to
support this stance. Kohut's theory and his innovations in technique counterbalance these
classical points of view. First, by grounding analytic work upon empathic immersion in
the other's world, he places the center of gravity, not in the analyst's. perceptions of reality,
but in the interactional field that exists between patient and analyst. Second, his core
concept of selfobject requires the an8Iyst to comprehend the patient through the patient's -
effect on the analyst's interior life. Hence, by definition, the analyst cannot assume a
stance outside of, and certainly not superior to, the patient.
No analyst would dare interpret a dream without the patient's continuous cooperation,
ideally with as little defense as possible. Yet applied analyses of static works of art are
never dialogical. The novel, the painting, and Confessions cannot respond, cannot correct,
and cannot deepen the initial interpretation (Wisdom, 1967).
At a more profound level, to the degree one is removed by time, culture and language .
from one's subject, one has fewer and fewer resources ~ith which one could generate an
empathic response. For Kohut this is the first order of business. Should the analyst fail
to establish a semblance of empathic understanding, all subsequent formulations will be
extraneous to the deep need of the other to be understood: "Concretely speaking, whenever
a patient reacts with rage to the anlyst's interpretations, he has experienced him, from
the point of view of the archaic self that has been activated in analysis, as a nonempathic
attacker of the integrity of his self" (Kohut, 1977: 91). Consequently, while many, if not
most, members of the text's customary home, say, theology, feel aggrieved by applied
analyses, analysis itself suffers a similar distortion.
Having protested that, I plunge ahead and describe Confessions as a selfobject
generated by Augustine to consolidate a newly won sense of coherence. Since everyone
needs selfobjects throughout their lives, this is not pathologizing the text. On the contrary,
it may help us understand why we find it necessary to revive Augustine's ideal image
again and again, especially on anniversary occasions like this.
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Confessions illuminates a great mind interrogating itself and demanding a response
from both God and humans. Augustine touched on this theme only to reject it in Book
10: "Why, then, does it matter to me whether men should hear what I have to confess,
as though it were they who were to cure all the evil that is in me?" (208). His theological
answer is that if his readers share his own striving after charity, they will discern the
troth of his account: "But charity believes all things - all things, that is, which are spoken
by those who are joined as one in charity - and for this reason I, too, 0 Lord, make
my confession aloud in the hearing of men" (208). This capacity for charity would seem
to derive from the noblest portion of human being, the soul, which is the "better part
of me because it animates the whole of my body. It gives it life, and this is something
that no body can give to another body. But God is even more. He is the Life of my soul"
(213). How can we know God? Only through the soul and its unique capacity to interrogate
its memories and its "vast cloisters" (215). It is the "great force of life in living man,
mortal though he is"! (224).
Confessions rings with Augustine's great pleasure in recalling his past, even the errors
of his youth. While one cannot doubt his sincerity, neither can one doubt the tremendous
intellectual pleasure he gained in composing the account. His denunciations of ordinary
boyish pranks, for example, are far grander and more eloquent than the deeds warrant.
Of course, he could not say that, since it would amount to another sin, intellectual pride~
which, in· turn, would have to be punished. This obsessional quality runs throughout
Confessions, as it does throughout any account dominated by a superego as severe as
Augustine's. (One thinks of the obsessive moralist who, having performed a good deed,
takes pleasure in that fact and in turn recognizes that pleasure as a sin that must be
punished, and then takes pleasure in that new bit of godliness, etc.)
In Kohut's terms, Augustine's unending self-analysis and his unending complaints
about his moral failings derive from his repression of selfobject needs. Contrary to his
manifest rejection of the pleasures of being read by mere mortals, Confessions represents
a covert plea for selfobject relationships with an audience whose responses Augustine
treasures deeply. Given his immense talents and a culture which seems to have offered
every opportunity for self debasement, Augustine's struggles and solutions are remarkable.
From Kohut's point of view, the young man's efforts to come to terms with his talents
revolved around precisely narcissistic issues: how could he control himself and how channel
his skills in ways that would restrain himself and keep his feet on the ground?
Confessions tells us his natural father was not equal to the task. Consequently, an
extraordinaryily talented boy searched for other persons whom he could idealize and then
trust with that task. In Kohut's terms, he needed to find suitable selfobjects. Hence he
look6d to Faustus, then Ambrose, and finally God, the most ideal of fathers. If it· is God,
not I, who commands such powers, then surely God will hear my confession, "because
you first willed that I should confess to you, 0 Lord my God. For you are gracious, your
mercy endures for ever" (253).
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SELFOBJECT RELATIONSHIP IN CONFESSIONS
Like other psychoanalytic theories of pre-oedipal development, expecially those dealing
with the earliest events in the development of the self, Kohut's work rests upon a clinical
premise most adults ·do not share: that human beings must construct slowly their
understanding of themselves as whole, complete beings. Both common sense and
traditional metaphysics assume that individuals are independent and coherent singularities.
Although William James (1902) had described "subliminal selves" earlier, pre-oedipal
theory systematically investigates the pathways that lead from relatively diffused, partial
selves, to an adult sense of continuity and coherence. Erikson's basic propositions (1950)
about ego identity and its pathological variants, especially identity diffusion, allude to
a late manifestation of what Kohut terms self-pathology.
Contrary to common sense, "Selfobjects are objects which we experience as part of
our self; the expected control over them is, therefore, closer to the concept of control which
a grown-up expects to have over his own body and mind than to the concept of the control
which he expects to have over others" (Kohut and Wolf, 1978: 414). Augustine wrote
Confessions as an adult looking back towards his childhood. Lacking the concept of
selfobject, he naturally interpreted infantile behavior toward others as identical to adult
behavior. From that perspective, with its stringent superego, infantile needs for selfobject
relationships will appear pathological (or sinful).
Yet, just as repressed sexual needs return in the form of symptoms, repressed
narcissistic needs for selfobject merger return in adult lif~. These great needs, to feel worthy .
in oneself (an aspect of the "grandiose self!'), and to feel bonded to an idealized other
("idealized parental imago"), cannot be ignored since they constitute the basic drive to
attain and retain a sense of coherence. However, unlike sexual impulses which may take
circuitous routes, including abstinence, Kohut argues that narcissistic yearnings are vital
and require an actual, external, other for their fulfillment. This has led some of his critics
to charge Kohut with environmentalism: that he ignores that traditional psychoanalytic
empasis upon vicissitudes of unconscious fantasies.
An extreme critic might contend that he therefore ignores the patient's responsibility
for his or her neurotic condition. This misses Kohut's point. Narcissistic wishes may be
neuroticized and therefore distorted. But since they represent fundamental needs one
cannot and should not hope to analyze them away. They are not, in other words, symptoms
that will disappear upon correct interpretation. Hence, in one of his major papers, Kohut
speaks about the transformation of narcissistic hopes, not their dissolution (1966). Needs
to feel worthy, creative, and linked to a shared center of infinite value will not disappear
(Fowler, 1981). Analysis is thus a situation in which "the damaged self begins to strive
to achieve or to re-establish a state of c~hesion, vigour and inner harmony" (Kohut and
Wolf, 1978: 414).
Erikson says of Luther, that if one has no psychology of the unconscious, one must
have a theology of heaven and hell (1958). We may say the same about selfobject needs.
If one's developmental psychology assumes that infants and children are wholly formed
selves from the beginning, then the deep needs associated with the use of selfobjects will
emerge as the work of a dark Power. They will seem extraordinary, uncanny and
depersonalized. Hence, to control them the conscious self will necessarily call upon an
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equally uncanny and extraordinary power of Light.
AUGUSTINE'S DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
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Augustine agrees with the majority opinion when he speculates about infantile
development in the first chapters of Confessions. .Indeed, the harshness of his views
suggests a strqng reaction to precisely the needs for bonding, merger, and selfobject
relationships that Kohut describes. His initial paean to God might equally well describe
the infant's experience of the good-enough mother merged with her adoring child:
[S]ince nothing that exists could exist without you, does this mean that whatever exists does, in
this sense contain you? If this is so, since I too exist, why do I ask you to come into me? ... I should
be null and void and could not exist at all, if you, my God, were not in me. Or is it rather that I
should not exist, unless. I existed in you? But if I exist in you. how can I call upon you to come
to me? (22).
He solves this conundrum by envisioning God in ways which are strikingly female
(even though he uses masculine nomenclature):
And when you pour yourself out over us. you are not drawn down to us but draw us up to yourself:
you are not scattered away, but you gather us up. You fill all things. but do you fill them with your
whole self? ... You support, you fill, and you protect all things. You create them. nourish them,
and bring them to perfection (22-23).
He deepens this metaphor and at the same time shifts from a hymn to autobiography
by linking God's infinite desire to love His creatures with his mother's breasts:
But neither my mother nor my nurses filled their breasts of their own accord, for it was you who
used them, as your law prescribes. to give me infant's food.... All this I have learned since then,
because all gifts you have given to me. both spiritual and material. proclaim the truth of it. But in
those days all I knew was how to suck, and how to lie still when my body sensed comfort or cry
when it felt pain (25).
From our contemporary vantage point, it easy to see how Augustine misconstrues
the infant's experience. He constantly anthropomorphizes infantile self-experience. I.nfants
are basically adults who are very small, inarticulate, and consequently helpless. They are
like foreigners in Gargantua: captives of superior, gigantic figures whose language they
must comprehend slowly. Wittgenstein took Augustine to task for this theory of language
(1958: 1-3). It shows equally well Augustine's unempathic view of infant psychology and
the baby's inner world where the wishes are inside and no faculty can penetrate its mind.
Since babies are miniature adults, according to this belief, they too sin and have faults
which must be "rooted out" (27). Just as the capacity for signification is present from
the beginning, infants are capable of gluttony and other sins.
At a manifest level, Augustine recognizes that these are speculations, based on his
observations of infants and not part of his conscious memory. At the same time he wants
to inculcate the truth of the doctrine of original sin (28). He attacks precisely those pre-
oedipal yearnings that Kohut (and others) have designated as the crucial needs which
must be satisfied before secondary structuralization can occur.
Augustine is not a patient, and his account is not a case report: it is a complex polemic,
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apology, and theological treatise. Yet it articulates a world view that is so inimical to
Kohut's values it will pay to contrast his consistent condemnation of narcissistic wishes
with Kohut's general theory.
In this light, Augustine's story of his boyhood sickness suggests a mother who shares
the absolutist superego of her son, and perhaps the entire epoch. The boy is very sick;
his mother fears for his life. She makes plans to have him baptized. But he recovers and
"So my washing in the waters of baptism was postponed, in the surmise that, if I continued
to live, I should defile myself again with sin, and after baptism, the guilt of pollution
would be greater and more dangerous" (32).
This would seem to be the antithesis of an empathic view of childhood. In psychiatric
parlance it suggests a world view that is radically paranoid: forces of evil inhabit everyone,
including infants, and these must be met by forces of good. The ego is a weaK, lonely
hero struggling to align itself with the forces of good against the forces of evil. Augustine
uses a beautiful metaphor that describes well this metapsychology: tides of temptation
beat upon him who is yet "unmolded clay rather than upon the finished image which
has yet received the stamp of baptism" (33).
This passage evokes the Genesis account of Yahweh, the potter who molded human
beings into Yahweh's image (or eikon as the Septuagint expresses it). Yet it rejects that
relative security by evoking also the evil effect floods of temptation may have upon weak
and unformed characters.
Liquid metaphors appear thr<?ughout Augustine's account as they do in Freud's
general account of the drives. Although separated by language and world view, both men
conceive inner battles as st~ggles between upwelling, overwhelming, tides of eros.
Augustine describes his sexual impulses as filthy lust, brewed in a cauldron of passion
(52-53). Less poetically, Freud described the channels in the mind through which the libido
flows, carving out an ever deepening bed of habit (1915). While he avoids moralizing about
these currents of libido, Freud's basic stance toward them is identical to that of Augustine:
one must acquire sufficient moral strength to overcome them. Augustine invoked God's
power, while Freud, to our great advantage, de-escalated the issue to one of human
proportions. Kohut's great contribution has been to advance this chain of moral reasoning
(in the sense of moral philosophy).
Given Augustine's epoch, then, one can see the Confessions as an immense
achievement. It elaborated a new intellectual achievement in the Socratic ideal of self-
knowledge and self-control. It is not tendentious to point out that this is a narcissistic
achievement in the sense that it permits Augustine to achieve a state of merger with
an idealized Other who, in tum, can mirror his deepest hopes.
Many commentators have remarked upon Augustine's lack of empathy for his
scholastic opponents and for his concubine. These are striking deficits, yet within that
culture, indeed perhaps up to our century, one sees very few instances of any greater
depth. To summarize a complex point, a culture that turns to transcendental solutions
for selfobject needs will remain unempathic to the inner life of an individual. That is,
transcendental solutions necessarily leap outside the individual's actual interior experience
and invoke the authority of an idealized Wholly Other whose face is always obscure and
intentions mysterious. According to this reading, therefore, Augustine's implacable self-
accusations are, as it were, reasonable attempts to make God mirror him, even if to
SYMPOSIUM ON AUGUSTINE'S CONFESSIONS 73
condemn him. The incessant, compulsive quality of the Confessions derives, perhaps, from
this profound need.
One might see the law of the return of the repressed operating with remorseless logic
in the latter part of Confessions, where we read that Augustine continued to invoke a
transcendental solution to his sexual conflicts. In his and Freud's psychologies, these
struggles are eternal because the drives themselves are immortal powers that strive always
to overthrow the ego's better judgment. Freud usually eschewed transcendental language.
Yet such language appears when he describes the uncanny force the instincts exert upon
the struggling ego, which must contend with these potentially immortal substances (Freud,
1920; 1921).
Freud's basic theorems about the two great instincts (or drives), eros and
destructiveness, parallel Augustine's fascination with Manichaeism. It also describes
human beings as battlegrounds over which two great powers struggle. Freud's
preoccupation with the fate of these aggrandized and immortal substances parallels
Augustine's struggle to shake off his fascination with Manichaeism.
Kohut counters both men's implicit metaphysics by tracing sexualization not to some
fundamental drive that requires transcendental solution, but to deficits in a self-selfobject
relationship:
Instead of the further development of a firmly cohesive self able to feel the glow of healthy pleasure
in its affectionate and phase-appropriate sexual functioning and able to employ self-confident
assertiveness in the pursuit of goals, we find thoughout life a continuing propensity to experience
the fragments of love (sexual phantasies) rather than love, and the fragments of assertiveness (hostile
fantasies) rather than assertiveness, and to respond to these experiences ... with anxiety. (1984:
25, emphasis mine). . .
Parents, like Monica, who attend primarily to the control of these fragmentation
products systematically deny that the child has a coherent and cohesive self. Kohut does
not forget that sexualization and aggressivization mark a great deal of ordinary human
experience. He does deny that these express the ultimate constituents of human nature,
the bedrock of our animal natures which all honest persons must recognize. Augustine,
like Freud, and like most Western moralists up to our times, increased this sense of
fragmentation by taking for granted that sexual impulses, that "hissing cauldron of lust"
(55), are irreducible forces which civilization must constrain, just as the Olympians jailed
the Titans. Hence, when Augustine describes Alypius's backsliding into his earlier
fascination with gladiatorial combat, he invokes again the metaphor of upwelling drives:
"When he saw the blood, it was as though he had drunk a deep draught of savage passion.
Instead of turning away, he fixed his eyes upon the scene and drank ~ all its frenzy,
unaware of what he was doing" (122).
In contrast, Kohut views sexualization as a product of prior, narcissistic injury.
Sexualized and aggressivized images, as well as perverse actions, are attempts to repair
a wounded self.
Once a selfobject transference is established, the patient (or child) responds to
alterations in it with fragmentation anxiety, which in tum elicits frantic, Sexualized, efforts
to repair the breach in self caused by that empathic failure. Given the subtleties and variety
of selfobject transferences, empathic failures occur frequently. For example, some patients~
like some children, may experience a two or three minute delay as sure signs of the analyst's
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disinterest. In response to that perception, they withdraw their deep wishes for merger
with the analyst. Since that wish formed part of the armature, as it were, around which
they wound their psychic structure, withdrawing it causes a deep feeling of incoherence.
{{ohut calls such moments "mini-fragmentations." Because fragmentation is so painful.
patients seek relief from it immediately in characteristic ways.
The broadest and most obvious route to effect such repair is through
hypersexualization. In phenomenological terms, hypersexualization seems especially
attractive precisely because it permits one to establish an intense feeling of body integrity
and wholeness, even if it is temporary. To speculate further, it seems likely that increased
sexual excitation, especially orgasm, serves to concretize and validate the underlying
unconscious fantasy. In male homosexual experience, for example, selfobject needs may
be symbolized through the fantasy of incorporating the awesome power of father's penis
and retaining it inside, as an actual structure or "backbone." In female homosexual
experience, orgasm may often symbolize an actual merger with the mother's body and
therefore instantiate her internal presence. In both instances Kohut permits us to account
for the perverse action as attempts to use physical experience (orgasm) to replace
temporarily psychological structure.
These are not radical psychoanalytic conclusions. Numerous ego psychologists have
made similar comments about the fantasy structures underlying perverse (and normal)
sexuality. Kohut's contribution has included the clinical insight that perversions, especially
in narcissistically vulnerable patients, occur as the con~equenceof empathic failures. I
think this is an" extremely helpful point. of view.
Kohut describes many such sequences in his texts. I suggest that we see an
intergenerational sequence in Confessions. Monica's nurse exaggerates the danger (and
power) of alcohol to her wards and so instills a lifelong fascination with wine that penneates
Monica's character. The nurse's mistrust of the child's internal capacities represents a
maternal failure. Indeed, it symbolizes her recognition of the young girl's intense "oral"
need for nurture displaced onto alchohoI. Hence her premonition of Monica's addiction,
made manifest by her obsessive efforts to train her words to ignore normal thirst,
guarantees precisely such dependency. Like the nurse, Monica and her son disdain those
feelings and needs for an internalized "good object" (a selfobject) that would sustain her
internally. Not accidently, these needs for ongoing maternal reflection of her narcissistic
wishes become symbolized by the beverage, wine, which gives one a temporary sense of
elation, power, and internal warmth. In this sense, Monica's addiction to wine and her
son's addiction to hypersexual actions represent their responses to intergenerational
failures. Nurse, mother, and son disdain these internal needs and seek to alienate
themselves from part of themselves. Augustine calls such needs the product of a
"despicable fault" (194).
This issue reappears in the dramatic conversation between mother and son which
Augustine reports immediately following this account: "no bodily pleasure, however great
it might be and whatever earthly light might shed lustre upon it, was worthy of
comparison, or even mention, beside the happiness of the life of the saints" (197). Their
conversation mounts in intensity and spiritual fervor: "At length we came to our own
souls and passed beyond them to that place of everlasting plenty, where you feed Israel
forever with the food of troth" Finally, "for one fleeting instant we reached out and tou,-bed
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it. Then with a sigh, leaving our spiritual harvest bound to it, we returned to the sound
of our own speech, in which each word has a beginning and an ending." When a fleshly,
human mother cannot provide a sense of inherent worthiness and narcissistic wholeness,
God, the great mother who feeds Israel, will.
This passage precedes Augustine's account of his mother's death. Hence it looks
forward to that immense loss and serves to prepare author and reader for it. Its overt
message is that of a better life beyond this one, where words would not have a beginning
and an ending, but the fleeting moment would last forever. I think it also looks back to
the sharp denunciations of Monica's alcoholism and her son's life outside the true Church.
Mother and son engaged in a kind of spiritual ecstasy that unifies them in a common bond
of selfobject merger with God: "for all these things have the same message to tell, if only
we can hear it, and their message is this: We did not make ourselves, but he who abides
forever made us" (198).
From an analytic point of view, this immensely powerful notion of God's presence
corresponds directly to the universal human need to find, somewhere, another who knows
us to our depths, recognizes our faults, yet loves us completely. One might, using Kohut,
therefore say that the debate between Augustine and Freud centers on the question of
to what degree God is a selfobject, or God is a Wholly Other who has instilled in God's
creatures an ineradicable longing to see their creator face to face.
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